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Florida Supreme Court. B e c au s e 
the encounter took place in the 
cramped confines of a bus, Bostick 
argued that the police presence was 
much more intimidating than it 
would be in another setting. Bostick, 
111 S. Ct. at 2386. Reversing the 
lower courts' decision, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that a seizure 
resulted when the police officers 
randomly boarded the bus and with-
out articulable suspicion, asked for 
the passengers' consent to search 
their luggage. Id. at 2385 (citing 
554So.2dat1154(Fla.1989». The 
court reasoned that a seizure oc-
curred because a reasonable passen-
ger "would not have felt free to 
leave the bus to avoid questioning 
by the police." Id. The court thus 
adopted a perse rule that bus searches 
were unconstitutional. The United 
States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide whether the Florida 
per se rule was compatible with 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
In addressing the issue ofwhether 
a police encounter of this nature 
constituted a "seizure" within the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court outlined established case law 
which demonstrated that "a seizure 
does not occur simply because a 
police officer approaches an indi-
vidual and asks a few questions." 
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. The 
Court stated that "[s]o long as a 
reasonable person would feel free 
'to disregard the police and go about 
his business,' the encounter is con-
sensual and no reasonable suspicion 
is required." Id. (citing California 
v. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 
(1991». 
The Court then rejected Bostick's 
claim that his case was different 
because it took place in the cramped 
quarters of a bus. The Court rea-
soned that Bostick's movements 
were confined not because police 
conduct was "coercive," but because 
he was a passenger on a bus that was 
scheduled to depart. Id. at 2387. 
Because a person traveling on a bus 
has no desire to leave, the presence 
of the police was not an accurate 
measurement ofthe coerciveness of 
the encounter. Id. 
The Court then cited INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), 
which it found to be dispositive of 
the issue. In Delgado, the Court 
held that a seizure had not occurred 
when workers were questioned in 
their workplace and were not free to 
leave without being questioned. Id. 
(citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218). 
The Court observed that the offic-
ers' conduct provided the workers 
with no reason to believe that they 
would be detained if they refused to 
answer any questions. Id. The 
Delgado Court emphasized that the 
workers' ability to leave was not 
restricted by the police officers, but 
by voluntary obligations to their 
employers. Id. 
The Court stated that Bostick's 
case was analytically indistinguish-
able from Delgado. Id. Like the 
workers in Delgado, the Court rea-
soned that Bostick's movement was 
restricted by a factor independent of 
the police conduct. Id. Therefore, 
according to the Court, the "free to 
leave" analysis used by the Florida 
Supreme Court was not the correct 
inquiry. Id. The Court held instead 
that the "appropriate inquiry is 
whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers' re-
quests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter." Id. The location ofthe 
encounter is only one ofthe factors 
to be considered in determining 
whether a seizure had occurred. Id. 
In observing that its opinion is 
consistent with prior decisions, the 
Court noted that it has previously 
stated that ''the crucial test is whether, 
taking into account all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the encoun-
ter, the police conduct would 'have 
communicated to a reasonable per-
son that he was not at liberty to 
ignore the police presence and go 
about his business.''' Id. (citing 
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567, 569 (1988». Consequently, 
the Court held that it was not per se 
unconstitutional for police officers 
to board buses and randomly re-
quest passengers' consent to search 
their luggage. Id. at 2389. In light 
of its decision, the Court remanded 
the case to the Florida courts to 
determine whether a seizure took 
place. 
Although the Supreme Court 
claimed that no new ground was 
broken by its decision, it is now 
clear that police officers may pursue 
drug interdiction efforts on buses. 
Prior Court decisions have allowed 
police officers to question individu-
als in such places as the workplace, 
in airport lobbies, and on city streets. 
The reasoning in Florida v. Bostick 
indicates that individuals will no 
longer be immune from police ques-
tioning in many other public places. 
The Court's decision has sent a 
message that police may question 
individuals anywhere they please so 
long as the encounter is not coer-
cive. 
- Will Jacobi 
Craig v. State: THE COURT OF 
APPEALS REDEFINES 
WHEN AN ABUSED CHILD 
IS CONSIDERED SUFFI-
CIENTL Y UNAVAILABLE TO 
TESTIFY AND ALLOWS FOR 
THE TAKING OF TESTI-
MONY BY CLOSED-CIRCUIT 
TELEVISION. 
In a case of constitutional im-
port, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land clarified when it is appropriate 
for a trial court judge to order the 
testimony ofa child abuse victim to 
be taken outside the courtroom 
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throughclosed-circuittelevision. In 
Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 
1991), the court established flexible 
guidelines forjudges to follow when 
confronted with the invocation of 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 
9-102 (1989), which permits child 
abuse victims to testify through 
closed-circuit television. 
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted 
on six counts stemming from the 
alleged sexual assault of a six year 
old child. Prior to trial in the Circuit 
Court for Howard County, the state 
invoked Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. § 9-102 (1989). Despite 
Craig's Sixth Amendment confron-
tation-based objections, the child 
witnesses were permitted to testify 
via one-way, closed-circuit televi-
sion. Craig was subsequently con-
victed on all six counts. Craig, 588 
A.2d at 330. After affirmance by 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, the court of appeals re-
versed. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court ofthe United States, the Court 
reversed the court of appeals and 
remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion. Id. 
Upon reconsideration, the court 
of appeals quoted the Supreme Court 
at length, holding that the trial 
judge's use of closed-circuit televi-
sion was inappropriate without a 
"case specific finding of necessity." 
Id. at 331 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 
U.S. 1012,1025 (1988)). Thecourt 
first reasoned that the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause 
did not prohibit a witness from tes-
tifying outside of the defendant's 
physical presence where closed-cir-
cuit television was used. Specifi-
cally, the "degree of necessity that 
supports [the] use of a procedure .. 
. that would otherwise not satisfy 
theconfrontationrequirements" was 
a showing of witness unavailability. 
Id. at 333. 
Furthermore, the court of ap-
28 - The Law Forum/22.1 
peals followed its ruling in 
Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 
289 (Md. 1987), which stated that a 
child witness who suffered serious 
emotional distress was sufficiently 
unavailable to satisfy the relinquish-
ment of the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront a wit-
ness testifying against him or her. 
Id. at333. The court, however, held 
that the finding of unavailability 
must be based upon a "particular-
ized examination of all circum-
stances concerning the impact of 
public testimony in the presence of 
the defendant upon the emotional 
health of the child." Id. (citing 
Wildermuth, 530 A.2dat289)). The 
court's holding established that the 
use of such a drastic procedure must 
be preceded by the judge "mak[ ing] 
a specific finding that testimony by 
the child in the courtroom in the 
presence of the defendant would 
result in the child suffering serious 
emotional distress .... " Id. at 331 
(quoting Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. 
Ct 3157, 3170 ( 1990) (citing Craig 
v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md. 
1989) (Craig I))) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
The court reasoned that the pres-
sure of such a confrontation bur-
dened the child with severe emo-
tional stress and fear, thus inhibit-
ing the child's ability to communi-
cate. Id. at 333. The court, how-
ever, stressed the importance that 
the finding o funavailability be based 
on the impact of the public testi-
mony on that particular child, as 
opposed to children in general. 
Despite the Supreme Court's hold-
ing that the trial judge could base his 
invocation of section 9-102 solely 
on the findings of an expert, the 
Court of Appeals ofMaryland stated 
that, "expert testimony may not be 
necessary to establish the necessary 
predicate' to invoke § 9-102." Craig, 
588 A.2d at 335 (quoting 
Wildermuth, 530 A.2d at 275). 
To avoid confusion, the court of 
appeals established specific guide-
lines for trial court judges to follow 
when confronted with a prosecutor's 
motion to have achildtestify through 
closed-circuit television. See Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-
102 (1989). First and foremost, 
"[t]he trial judge shall make a case-
specific finding of necessity .... " 
Craig, 588 A.2d at 335. Next, the 
availability of the child shall be 
addressed, with special consider-
ation given to the child's ability to 
testify in the presence of the ac-
cused. Ordinarily, this shall be de-
termined by the ''judge personally 
observing and interviewing the 
child," however, such interaction 
"under § 9-102 . . . should be the 
rule rather than the exception." 
Craig, 588 A.2d at 335-36. Addi-
tionally, the judge may decide 
whether or not the defendant may be 
present during questioning. Id. The 
judge then shall decide on the neces-
sity of expert testimony. However, 
the court of appeals firmly believed 
thatthe trial court judge was capable 
of making the decision on his or her 
own, and only need consider the use 
of expert testimony. Finally, the 
judge shall have full control over 
''the means by which the procedure 
shall be effected .... " Id. at 336. 
The court added that the prudent 
judge should consider the "reason-
able availability of measures which 
would be the least restrictive of the 
right of confrontation, yet serve the 
purpose of § 9-102 .... " Id. 
The companion case of Gilbert 
v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991), 
similarly depicted an adult accused 
of child abuse. Like Craig, the state 
sought to invoke section 9-102. 
Gilbert objected, and after much 
debate, the judge decided to inter-
view the child in his chambers, 
joined by both counsel and the ste-
nographer, but not by the defendant. 
The child was openly frightened of 
the defendant, therefore, the judge 
concluded that the child was not 
emotionally prepared to testify in 
open court before the defendant. 
Accordingly, the judge decided that 
a two-way television should be used 
in such a way that both the child and 
the defendant could see one another 
without actual confrontation. 
Gilbert's motion fora new trial was 
denied and he received a fifteen year 
prison sentence. Craig, 588 A.2d at 
336. Gilbert appealed, but before 
the court of special appeals had an 
opportunity to decide the case, the 
court of appeals issued a writ of 
certiorari. Id. at 337. 
The defendant claimed that the 
trial judge erred in permitting the 
section 9-1 02 procedure without first 
examining the child victim testify-
ing in the presence.ofthe defendant. 
Id. at 338. Nevertheless, the court 
of appeals upheld the trial court 
judge's findings, basing its decision 
on two rationales: (1) the trial court 
judge did not have the guidance of 
Craig I nor Maryland v. Craig, 
which favors the initial interview in 
front of the defendant; and (2) the 
court ruled that it was within the 
trial court judge's discretion whether 
or not to allow the defendant to be 
present. Id. at 338-39. 
In summary, Gilbert's case was 
decided differently than Craig's 
due to the trial court judge's per-
sonal examination of the child prior 
to her testifying. The judge made a 
case-specific finding, and concluded 
that the child was unable to testify in 
open court without subjecting her-
selfto serious emotional trauma. Id. 
at 339. 
Craig and Gilbert established a 
set of guidelines, not a rigid for-
mula, for trial court judges to follow 
in child abuse cases. The ruling in 
Craig leaves a tremendous amount 
of discretion in the hands of the trial 
court judge. Gilbert indicates that 
so long as the trial judge makes an 
individualized evaluation of the 
child's emotional health, his or her 
decision to implement section 9-
102 will be upheld. These cases 
demonstrate an effort to provide fur-
ther guidelines in child abuse cases, 
and in so doing, the court of appeals 
has pushed the right of confronta-
tion to its constitutional limits in an 
all out effort to protect abused chil-
dren. 
- Andrew S. Kasmer 
Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell: FEDERAL COURT 
SUPERVISION OF PREVI-
OUSL Y SEGREGATED 
SCHOOLS MAY BE TERMI-
NATED IF SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH DE-
SEGREGATION OBJEC-
TIVES HAS BEEN ATTAINED 
In Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991), the 
United States Supreme Court pro-
mulgated a standard for dissolving 
desegregation decrees. Specifically, 
the Court ruled that a federal district 
court may lift a desegregation de-
cree if a school district can show 
that it has complied with the decree 
in good faith and that vestiges of 
past discrimination have been elimi-
nated to the extent practicable. If a 
decree is to be terminated or dis-
solved, the parties are entitled to a 
detailed statement to that effect from 
the court. 
In 1972, the Board of Education 
of Oklahoma City was ordered to 
adopt a court-supervised desegre-
gation plan involving busing. This 
plan was designed to integrate the 
schools in its district and end de jure 
segregation. After complying with 
the desegregation decree for five 
years, the Board moved in 1977 to 
end court supervision of the plan. 
After finding that the Board had 
substantially complied with the con-
stitutional requirements and that lack 
of court supervision would not be 
detrimental to the unitary system 
the Board had achieved, the district 
court terminated its jurisdiction in 
the case. 
In 1984, the Board adopted the 
Student Reassignment Plan (SRP). 
This plan was designed to alleviate 
greater burdens placed on blackchil-
dren caused by demographic changes 
in the area that resulted in longer 
busing routes. In 1985, the respon-
dents, black students and their par-
ents, asked the district court to re-
open the case, contending that the 
school district had not achieved ''uni-
tary" status and that SRP was a 
return to segregation. Id. at 634. 
The district court refused to re-open 
the case, holding that its 1977 find-
ing that the school system was ''uni-
tary" was res judicata and that the 
school system had remained uni-
tary. Id. The Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held 
thatthe 1977 orderdidnotterminate 
the original injunction. Id. 
The court of appeals remanded 
the case for the district court to 
determine if the injunction should 
be lifted or modified. On remand, 
the district court vacated the injunc-
tion because it found that the previ-
ously ordered desegregation plan 
was unworkable dueto demographic 
changes, the school district had 
maintained its unitary status, and 
that the SRP was not designed with 
discriminatory intent. Id. at 634-35. 
The Court of Appeals again re-
versed. Id. at 635. Relying on 
United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106 
(1932), the court ruled that the in-
junction should remain in effect until 
the school district could show that 
its existence was causing a "griev-
ous wrong evoked by new and un-
foreseen conditions." Dowell, 111 
S. Ct. at 635 (quoting Swift, 286 
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